among individuals, families and communities of many diverse cultures yet contact with these (multi)cultures can be difficult, rejected or ignored'. 4 For me, the question posed by Josie shows the symbolic void imposed at a discursive level between migrant groups and Aborigines. After reading more than seven hundred letters written by Italian migrants in Australia in the 1950s and 1960s, I was struck by the limited number of references to Aboriginal people. 5 Even those rare references usually have nothing to do with actual encounters and social exchanges: a father complains that children at his daughter's school sit on the floor 'come gli aborigeni' (like Aborigines); 6 another man complains that 'le mano nere' ([sic] black hands) stole something from him. 7 In this second case, it is not clear if 'le mano nere' is a reference to Aborigines or to Sicilians, 'la mano nera' being the infamous name often used in migratory contexts in reference to supposedly Sicilian--mafia gangs. 8 This lack of clarity is mostly due to the limited literacy of the author, which makes the letter almost unintelligible. Yet this was also the first instance in which I noticed during my research a possible conflation between Aborigines and Sicilians in Italian migrant discourse.
I have suggested elsewhere that the silence about relationships between Aborigines and Italian migrants should not be read as evidence of a sort of ethnic or racial vacuum in which Italian migrants settled separate from Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander people. Rather, it is a significant aspect of the complex and unresolved question about the racial and colonial role played by migrants in Australia. 9 What is often ignored, if not actually silenced, is not only the richness and vitality of encounters between Italian migrants and Aborigines, including intimate stories of sexual relationships, romantic love and family life, but also the colonial role Italian migrants have played through their settlements and through their support of racist ideologies and policies. As argued by Joseph Pugliese, the colonial practices that Italians and other non--Anglo migrants carried with them to Australia have largely been ignored. 10 The colonial ideologies and practices that non--Anglo migrants acquired and employed after arriving to Australia and in the process of settlement are also often unacknowledged. 11 In her book Tapestry, Maria Pallotta--Chiarolli tells of her mother Dora being taught to be fearful of black American soldiers stationed in Italy. Later, once in Australia, Dora was taught to hate and fear Indigenous people, often through openly racist and extremely offensive expressions.
For instance, Aborigines were called 'boongs' and described to her as 'dirty disease--filled thieves who were one step above animals'. 12 Importantly, Pallotta--Chiarolli suggests an intimate connection between Italian and Australian racism, as well as the possibility for new generations to resist such legacy. Her book remains, however, a rare instance of literary memory and critical reflection on Italian migrants' colonial and racist attitudes towards Aborigines.
Through references to four anecdotes, this article approaches the complex and often neglected topic of the relationship between Sicilian migrants and Aborigines.
What is particularly interesting in the encounters, social interactions and relationships between Sicilians and Aborigines, is that Sicilians have often themselves been victims of colonial exploitation and racial stereotyping in Italy and abroad. As I illustrate later in this article, Sicily's geographical proximity to Africa has sustained stereotypes of racial proximity between the Sicilians and the 'black others' of the African continent. Their alleged racial ambiguity has meant that Sicilian migrants, as well as other southern Italians (especially Calabresi), occupied for a long period a liminal and ambiguous position in the racial dichotomy, being at once (not enough) white and (almost) black; a position in which they could be(come) at the same time the colonisers and the colonised. experienced by humans, shares many of the characteristics associated with emotions: it is expressed and performed, it has a cognitive value but cannot be reduced only to its cognitive function, and it is a matter of and a tool for contested discourses, performances and artworks. Thus, the emotion of truth is not to be addressed as an epistemological tool to obtain objective factuality, but rather as a gnoseological issue about the emotional relationship between past and present, and its impact on individual lives and social experiences. 15 If one assumes truth, and therefore historical truth, to be an emotion, a corresponding methodology is required. This would need to expose the limitations of a teleological interpretation of history as a narrative of causes and effects based on factual evidences. 16 I attempt to contribute to the development of such a methodology by retelling and reflecting on my personal uncanny encounters with
Italian migrants in Australia, in an effort to conceptualise the fragile balance between the homely and the unhomely in migratory experiences as well as in academic research on migration. Through the use of historians' personal anecdotes, I intend to test the potential of an emotion of historical truth precisely where any claim of factual historical truth can be more easily challenged as not sustained by significant recorded evidences. In particular, I will suggest the value of these mainly unrecorded stories as moments of disruption to the alleged objectivity of researchand the related objectification of the scholar, as well as of the people whose stories she or he tells. For the same reason, I contest the devaluation of the oral transmission of knowledge, implicit in the rejection of evidences, such as anecdotes, that have not been locked into some form of (semi)permanent inscription (through writing, recording, photographs, and so on).
When reflecting on almost a decade of historical research into the lives of Italian migrants in Australia, I often find myself thinking about specific encounters with Italian migrants that have proved to be uncanny moments of disruption to the historical narratives I was trying to construct, as well as to the critical theories I intended to employ. Yet these encounters are often experienced outside the boundaries of 'valid' academic research, and therefore are rarely represented in a scholarly space. In the fields of oral history and anthropology, a typical response to this issue is summarised by Portelli's recommendation to never turn off the recorder while conducting interviews, even during breaks or the final greetings. As an experienced oral historian, Portelli knows all too well that often interviewees tell the most interesting stories and make the most striking comments outside the formal boundaries of the interview. He also suggests that turning off the recorder shows lack of respect, as it implies the interviewer is no longer interested in what the interviewee has to say. 17 Another solution is the direct observation of and note--taking about certain social and cultural events, a method typical of ethnographers. Both these solutions, while they are within well--established ethical boundaries and recommended to all oral historians and anthropologists, do not explain why so much truth is revealed in moments consciously or unconsciously perceived by the interviewee-and often also by the interviewer-as being outside the formality of academic research.
Furthermore, these solutions do not capture those moments of truth that originate from scholars' everyday conversations, meetings and experiences, reinstating instead the conviction that if historical evidence is to be academically valid, it must have been recorded. These moments of truth, I argue, are at the core of the scholarly work, especially when they have the potential to disrupt hegemonic discourses and narratives, as well as challenge the power of deafening silences and censored topics in defining reality. These moments of truth in fact come to constitute one of the most significant ways in which historians form their opinions about the matters they study. Yet the unscholarly nature of these unrecorded experiences means that often they are not addressed or even recognised as valuable scholarly material.
Sometimes, historians overcome such limitations through the use of anecdotes in the opening or concluding parts of their papers and speeches. Yet these anecdotes are usually presented as ironic statements that remain largely at the margins of the proper scholarly discourse; they thus become the counterpoint to the more serious matters of history, playing the stylistic function of balancing the perceived necessary VOLUME19 NUMBER2 SEP2013 130 seriousness of a historical paper. 18 My contention is that, in some instances, these moments of truth should instead be at the core of scholarly reflections. In other words, anecdotal evidence, which is usually confined to the function of an ironic embellishment, might play an essential and vital role in academic discourse, whenever the need arises for deep reflections on the nature of scholarly research, especially in those fields that aim to contest or complicate hegemonic perspectives.
In the following pages I will recount and discuss four anecdotes about The following four anecdotes, especially when considered together, have produced in me an emotion of truth. This emotion is personal, and therefore certainly influenced by the social and cultural constraints that define my privileged position in society as an educated, middle--class, white, able--bodied, heterosexual man. 21 The emotion of truth, however, is neither simply relative, nor an attempt to impose a falsely objective truth from a hegemonic position. On the contrary, by recognising truth as an emotion, I attempt to create a space of dialogue, exchange and challenge that is not structured around an objective and teleological factuality, but at the same time does not regress into the postcolonial politeness of the falsely guilty white scholar who 'confesses' a position of privilege. Such admission of white guilt not only allows the hegemonic white scholar to feel good about him or herself while continuing to enjoy colonial and racial privilege but, in fact, by sustaining a relativist position, undermines the political and cultural potentiality of a powerful dialogue around the truth of racism and colonialism.
-THE FOUR ANECDOTES
1.
A couple of years ago I was talking to Mario Bosin, 22 Aboriginal adults, who did not 'appreciate' civilisation, and preferred to remain in a primitive state rather than working. Caruso argues that even when the nuns were successful in educating these children, they were often taken away by those parents who had initially abandoned them. 24 
3.
The third anecdote displaces the position of Italians in relation to Aborigines, as constructed in the two previous episodes. In a recent conversation, Teresa Rosa 25 told me that her father, who arrived in Australia at a young age with his parents after the war, is Sicilian, while her mother is Aboriginal of the Kalkadoon people, her husband is English. We had a nice conversation about personal stories that do not fit into any of the typical dichotomies that still profoundly influence so much social, cultural and political interactions in Australia. Most of her conversation seemed to concern her need and ability to reduce the anxiety of other people. Such anxiety derives at times from cultural differences; for instance we discussed the Italians'
habit of staring at people, compared with the convention in Teresa's Kalkadoon community that prohibits younger people looking into the eyes of the elders. More often, however, it is the racial anxiety she needs to respond to, as if in twenty--first--century Australia a definite and unambiguous position within the racial dichotomy of black and white is still necessary. Interestingly, she noted how it was not only her own racial ambiguity that produced anxiety, but also the racial mixture of her own family of Sicilians, Aborigines and English. She remarked how in her family when her children were small it was often the fair skinned adult who carried the fair skinned children, and the darker skinned adult who carried the darker skinned children, so as to avoid the gaze, confusion and suspicion of people in public spaces such as supermarkets. described Australia as a land inhabited by dangerous cannibal savages. 31 These authors had actually never been in Australia and they both drew on a common repertoire of colonial imagery. Around three decades before Salgari, Ottavio
Barsanti, a friar who was sent to Australia as a missionary, described the Aborigines he encountered in the following terms:
mettere assieme le ossa di un uomo di statura comune, vestirlo poscia di una ruvida pelle di maiale, dargli denti e occhi bianchi, naso corto e schiacciato, labbra grosse, e finalmente mettergli in capo un fascio di ispidi e sozzi capelli… put together the bones of a man of average height, then dress him with a rough pig skin, give him white teeth and eyes, a short and flat nose, big lips, and finally put on his head a bunch of bristly, dirty hair… 32 What is particularly interesting here is that the friar does not simply describe a colonial/racist stereotype of the Aborigine, but also, in inviting the reader to imagine the Aborigine, literally gives instruction on how to assemble one, through sentences such as 'put together the bones', 'dress him [that is, the bones] with a VOLUME19 NUMBER2 SEP2013 136 rough pig skin', 'give him white teeth and eyes', 'put on his head a bunch of bristly, dirty hair'. Later, he describes Aboriginal men as resembling skeletons and spectres.
The whole description recalls the macabre action of an anthropologist from the colonial era literally putting together the remains of a dead Aborigine for a museum exhibition. The uncanny Other comes to occupy a liminal space between the living and the dead, not only in gothic literature but in the colonial representation of the Indigenous Other as spectre. 33 The first anecdote illustrates more than the persistence of certain racial stereotypes. It also shows the way our reactions in front of the Other can at times be of fear, not because we are faced with something or somebody we don't know, but because we are in front of something or somebody whose Otherness is in fact strangely familiar. This strange familiarity is read by Sara Ahmed as an effect of recognition: she suggests that 'when we look out "for strangers" we already know what we are looking for, that we are already familiar with what a stranger is supposed to be'. 34 This first anecdote illustrates her point. Ahmed argues that such an interpretation is an alternative to Freud's interpretation of the uncanny feeling, in which the strange familiarity is due to the return of the repressed: something we had repressed comes back and is at the same time strange and familiar. 35 Susanne Schech and Jane Haggis have contended that the centrality and power of whiteness relies on its racial invisibility; that is, on its claim to be non--racial. 38 They further suggest that this denies the complexity of Australian society and the role of migrants at the core of contemporary Australian culture. Toula
Nicolacopoulus and George Vassilacopoulos talk about the 'distinctively white
Australian constructions of whiteness', suggesting the dominant white Australia needs to locate the foreigner--within as 'white--non--white' or as 'white--but--not--white--enough'. 39 As already discussed, this is particularly true for those southern Italian migrants who have migrated in large numbers to Australia in the last century, and whose perceived racial ambiguity has for a long time represented a reason for suspicion by Australian institutions. Perera argues that those who identify themselves as white impose their centrality on the Australian nation and society by marginalising both the internal and the external non--white Others. 40 'the "emotional" room allocated to exploring the effects of racism and colonialism in the nation--space is increasingly limited. Consequently, alternative and more complex imaginings of the nation, which were already peripheral, are marginalised further still'. 42 A process of negotiation aimed at overcoming ethnic and racial discrimination will be possible only when Australian society as a whole is able to examine and analyse its complex structure, not only in the present and for the future, but also in its past. History, then, and, in this specific case, histories of encounters between Sicilians and Aborigines, plays an important role. The coffee room where I talked to Teresa literally became, for a few minutes, an 'emotional room', one of the many emotional and affective spaces in which new narratives of the nation might be(come) possible. VOLUME19 NUMBER2 SEP2013
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The café where I discussed with Marilena her Sicilian roots, and my own self--conflicted decision to take on the Australian citizenship, was also an 'emotional room'. It was particularly the latter topic that produced in me an uncanny feeling, pushing me to reflect on the complex relationship between migration, multiculturalism and (post)colonialism. Within the specific context of (post)colonial Australia, the most effective application of the concept of the uncanny to date is to be found in Ken Gelder and Jane Jacobs' study of Aboriginal sacredness and identity, particularly in their focus on the uncanny feelings produced by the unresolved issue of colonial dispossession, whereby 'what is "ours" may also be "theirs", and vice versa', so that 'one's place is always already another's place'. 43 generations'. 50 At the same time the reference to specific historical contexts may complement as well as challenge existential and transcendental uses of this aesthetic concept, which often denies the geographical and historical specificity, and political potential, of uncanny experiences. 51 In the interpretation of both Freud and Heidegger, and many other scholars after them, the uncanny is an anxious reaction to what is at once familiar and unfamiliar. This element of anxiety must be taken into consideration not only in our understanding of broad and widespread phenomena such as racism and xenophobia, but also in considering the emotional experiences of migrants, and the complex processes of negotiation between individuals and communities who intersect, meet and clash in the process of migration and settlement. Furthermore, the uncanny proves to be a very useful framework for understanding migrants' recollection of the past, and the relationship between memories of migration and settlement-individual and collective, private and public-and present ideologies and social practices.
In all the encounters described in this article, the present seems to be haunted by the past. 52 Traditionally, historical narrative has been based on a cause-effect development from the past to the present-which in many instances has also come to justify the relevance of the historical discipline in the management of the future, from banal imperatives such as 'to know your future you must know your past', 'know the past, find the future', and all similar variants, to the actual use of historical studies in the development of public policies. This teleological understanding of history has been challenged by many scholars over the last two or three decades, but remains the prevailing approach within both academic and popular history. In recent years, my work in oral history has encouraged me to reflect more deeply on the impact historical memories have on the present, as well as the impact of prevailing current ideologies and discourse on the shaping of our historical memories. I have been struck by the continuous, fragmentary, ambiguous intertwining between past and present, where rather than a teleological factuality of past causes and present effects, I have perceived fragments of historical truth travelling back and forward into multidimensional emotional spaces. The past only seems to make provisional sense when it reaches an 'address' in the present, so that we struggle to travel 'back to the future', while being overwhelmed by our impotence in the face of a past that, as such, cannot be changed. By letting everyday discourse challenge the linearity of our prevailing historical narratives, we may 
